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Devolution of Social Security 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Social security has been a reserved matter since devolution was implemented in 1999. The 
Calman Commission, reviewing the extent of devolved competences in 2009, recommended 
that pensions and benefits should remain a reserved matter on the basis that they were a 
central feature of the UK welfare state and the latter was an important constituent of the glue 
that held the union together.1 But a new all-party consensus was forged by the Smith 
Commission which recommended the devolution of substantial aspects of social security, 
including competence over: 
 
 Benefits for carers, disabled people and those who are ill (i.e. the current benefits 
Attendance Allowance, Carer’s Allowance, Disability Living Allowance (DLA), 
Personal Independence Payment (PIP), Industrial Injuries Disablement Allowance and 
Severe Disablement Allowance); 
 Benefits which currently comprise the Regulated Social Fund (i.e. Cold Weather 
Payment, Funeral Payment, Sure Start Maternity Grant and Winter Fuel Payment); 
and 
 Discretionary Housing Payments.2 
 
It recommended that the Scottish Parliament (SP) have complete autonomy in determining 
the structure and value of the above benefits or of any new benefits or services which might 
replace them. The proposals relating to Universal Credit (UC) were more complex. UC is a 
new income support benefit currently being rolled out across the UK which will eventually 
replace six existing means-tested benefits and tax credits including income support and 
housing benefit. Although UC will remain in general a reserved benefit the Commission 
recommended that the Scottish Parliament should have the power to vary the housing cost 
elements of UC (including power to vary the under-occupancy charge and local housing 
allowance rates, eligible rent, and deductions from benefits for non-dependents). It would 
also have power to change the frequency of UC payments, and to vary the existing UK 
Government plans for single household payments and for payment to landlords direct of 
tenants’ housing costs 
 
The Commission also recommended devolution of power to the SP to create new benefits in 
areas of devolved responsibility and to make discretionary payments in any area of welfare to 
top-up reserved benefits. Finally, it recommended devolution of all powers over support for 
unemployed people through the employment programmes after the existing commercial 
arrangements expire.3 
 
The welfare package was by far the most significant of Smith’s proposals extending 
substantive policy competence (as opposed to competence over finance). In purely financial 
terms, it devolves a substantial portion of the social security budget (approximately £2.7 
                                                          
1 Commission on Scottish Devolution, Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 21st 
Century (2009). 
2 Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament (2014), available 
at: https://www.smith-commission.scot/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/The_Smith_Commission_Report-1.pdf  
3 Delivery of the programmes is contracted out by the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP). 
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billion, or 15.3% of expenditure on hitherto reserved benefits in Scotland).4 It is also the 
devolution of a major public service potentially affecting hundreds of thousands of people. 
Moreover, it represents a remarkable change of heart by the pro-union parties given the 
position they had so recently taken in the Calman Commission. It can be explained by the 
need to deliver on the vow to grant extensive new powers to the Scottish Parliament made by 
the leaders of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democratic parties just before the 
independence referendum in September 2014. 
 
If the Calman Commission was right about the importance of the welfare state for social 
solidarity, then it must be questioned whether devolution of substantial aspects of social 
security is compatible with maintaining the integrity of the union in the long run. However, in 
this note I will concentrate on the more immediate issues that arise from the devolution of 
powers over social security benefits by the Scotland Act 2016. I will begin with a brief 
explanation of the benefits provisions of the 2016 Act, then go on to discuss policy 
autonomy, finance, institutional change intergovernmental cooperation and appeals. 
 
 
B. The Legislation 
 
Sections 22 to 35 of the Act are intended to give effect to the Smith Commission’s proposals.  
They add a number of further exceptions to the reservation of social security in Head F1 in 
Part 2 of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 (SA) and to the reservation of job search and 
support in head H3. Provision is also made for other matters including the exchange of 
information held for social security purposes between the UK Government and the Scottish 
Ministers. The date(s) for the transfer of social security functions have not yet been set and it 
is likely that it will be a staged process. Both current and new claimants will continue to have 
their entitlements determined under the existing UK legislation unless and until the Scottish 
Parliament decides to change the rules of entitlement for any of the devolved benefits or 
replace any of them with a new benefit. Section 53 SA provides for the general transfer of 
functions (including the making of delegated legislation) so far as exercisable within 
devolved competence from UK Ministers to Scottish Ministers. That provision will also 
apply to the newly devolved powers. This is important as much of benefit law is contained in 
subordinate legislation and section 53 will permit the Scottish Government (SG) to make 
significant changes to the devolved benefits by exercising transferred powers to make 
subordinate legislation. Any changes to policy on devolved benefits going beyond the scope 
of those transferred powers will require an Act of the Scottish Parliament. In future, it may be 
convenient to transfer further reserved executive powers relating to benefits using section 63 
SA. 
 
 
C. Policy Autonomy 
 
The Smith Commission Report is a rather terse document and does not explain the rationale 
for the particular package of social security powers recommended for devolution. Neither did 
the UK Government’s response.5 The argument most commonly cited for devolution of both 
                                                          
4 This figure is based on expenditure in 2014/15. See Scottish Government, Social Security for Scotland: 
Benefits being devolved to the Scottish Parliament (updated February 2016), available at: 
http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0049/00494409.pdf 
5 Scotland in the United Kingdom: An enduring settlement (2016), available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/scotland-in-the-united-kingdom-an-enduring-settlement  
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benefits for the ill, disabled and carers and for housing aspects of UC is the close relationship 
with other policy areas which are already devolved.6 Thus, in the case of the former, there is 
overlap with the social work functions of local authorities and the function of the National 
Health Service in Scotland. Devolution of these benefits might, therefore, give the 
opportunity to take a holistic view of government policy on assistance for disabled and ill 
persons and to come up with imaginative policy solutions as some commentators have 
suggested.7 In the case of the latter, virtually all aspects of housing including homelessness 
and landlord and tenant law in both private and social rented sectors are devolved and similar 
arguments about policy synergy have been made.8 
 
Perhaps the key question is how much freedom will the SP and SG have to change social 
security policy and entitlements? As a matter of strict law, the degree of autonomy is 
substantial. First, the SP will have absolute control over the rates at which all the devolved 
benefits are paid. Secondly, it could change the detailed conditions of entitlement for any of 
the devolved benefits. Thirdly, it could replace any or all of the devolved benefits with new 
benefits aimed at the same needs or indeed with services rather than cash benefits.   
 
There are some legal constraints arising from the way in which the scope of the new 
exceptions to the social security reservation have been defined which are of varying degrees 
of restrictiveness.  For instance, while disability benefits are broadly defined (the major 
exclusion being the power to create means-tested benefits), there is rather less room for 
manoeuvre in relation to housing. UC, which in future will be the principal benefit supporting 
the housing costs of those on low incomes (having absorbed housing benefit), remains 
reserved. What has been devolved is a limited number of specific aspects of the current 
HB/UC scheme as described above. Whilst the new powers will allow the SP and SG to make 
significant policy choices including nullifying the effect of the ‘bedroom tax’ by setting a 
zero rate, the continuing reservation of UC both reduces the scope for developing policy on 
housing-related benefits in a way which diverges from the rest of the UK and reduces the 
scope for a more wide-ranging rethink of the way in which housing subsidies are delivered, 
linking benefit policy to other aspects of housing policy. Moreover, the exercise of some of 
these powers will require the SG to consult  UK ministers on the practicability of the change 
proposed and UK Ministers can delay implementation (although not prevent it) for reasons of 
practicability.9 
 
Further constraints may arise from the interconnectedness of the benefit system, such as. 
‘passporting’, i.e. where the award of one benefit leads to entitlement to another. Such linkages 
between different benefits create ample room for spill-over effects (which may be financial or 
behavioural) of Scottish policy changes on the operation of reserved benefits in Scotland and 
in the rest of the UK. The principles of the fiscal framework mean that either government 
may have to reimburse the other for policy spill-over effects that have adverse financial 
                                                          
6 See, e.g. G. Lodge & A. Trench, Devo More And Welfare: Devolving Benefits  And Policy For A Stronger 
Union ( 2014), available at: http://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2014/03/Devo-more-and-
welfare_Mar2014_11993.pdf?noredirect=1  
7 See, e.g. Kirstein Rummery, “Devolving Care” available at: 
http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/blog/devolving-care  
8 See, e.g. Mark Stephens et al, The Devolution of Housing Benefit: Rebalancing Housing Subsidies in Scotland 
(2015), available at: 
http://scotland.shelter.org.uk/professional_resources/policy_library/policy_library_folder/the_devolution_of_ho
using_benefit_and_social_security_rebalancing_housing_subsidies_in_scotland  
9 Scotland Act 2016, ss 29 & 30. 
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consequences for the other..10 This potential extra cost may constrain policy choices.  This 
point is discussed further below 
 
 
 
D. Financing devolved social security 
 
The principal practical constraint on developing social security policy will be finance. When 
the social security powers are first devolved, the block grant to the SG will be increased by an 
amount equivalent to the level of benefit expenditure by the UK Government in Scotland on 
the relevant benefits in the preceding financial year and by an amount representing the costs 
of administering those benefits in Scotland. However, the decision on how much to spend on 
benefits will be for the SG. If expenditure were to be increased,  that could be financed by 
transferring funds from other parts of the Scottish budget or by raising taxes, primarily 
income tax, or a combination of both. 
 
However, budgeting for social security will present serious challenges. The amount added to 
the block grant should be roughly adequate to cover the devolved benefits at the time that 
powers are transferred but there is no guarantee that it will do so in future even if the 
devolved institutions do not seek to change those benefits. This is because, according to the 
fiscal framework, adjustments to the benefits element of the block grant will in future be 
made according to the Barnett formula.  This means that Scotland’s social security budget 
will be vulnerable both to the possibility of a reduction in benefits spending in England and 
Wales (and UK government’s forward plans to 2020 do assume further cuts in benefit 
spending) as well as the risk that spending per head in Scotland on the relevant needs rises 
faster than in the rest of the UK – a particular problem given that the proportion of Scotland’s 
population that is elderly (the major recipients of devolved benefits)11 will, on current trends, 
increase at a faster rate than that of the rest of the UK.12 
 
Thus, unless the SG is willing to increase taxation – which seems unlikely given the 
relatively conservative fiscal approach the SNP has adopted to date – it may find it difficult to 
maintain, let alone increase social security expenditure, by increasing the rates for existing 
benefits, extending eligibility to more people or introducing new benefits. 
 
There is a particular issue with policy spill-over effects. The two governments have agreed 
that there will be a transfer of funds from one to the other in respect of any financial effects 
that will directly and mechanically exist as a result of a policy change. Therefore, if the SG 
were to extend entitlement to a devolved benefit which acts as a passport to a reserved benefit 
that would trigger greater expenditure on reserved benefits in Scotland and require a transfer 
from the Scottish Budget to the DWP’s budget. Purely behavioural effects will not trigger 
                                                          
10 The agreement between the Scottish Government and the United Kingdom Government on the Scottish 
Government’s fiscal framework (February 2016) available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-
agreement-between-the-scottish-government-and-the-united-kingdom-government-on-the-scottish-
governments-fiscal-framework  
11 D Bell, “Who will be affected by Scotland’s new welfare powers?” available at: 
http://centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/sites/default/files/papers/welfarepowers_davidbell.pdf  
12 See, e.g. D Bell, written evidence for the Welfare Reform Committee’s inquiry into The Future Delivery of 
Social Security in Scotland, 6th Report, 2015 (Session 4), available at: 
http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/CurrentCommittees/94823.aspx#annc  
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transfers but exceptionally they may be taken into account where they are demonstrated to be 
material and both governments agree to do so.13 
 
E. Institutional Change in Scotland 
 
Welfare devolution requires institutional change for both the SG and SP.  The SG will have 
to acquire a policy development capacity in an area in which ministers and civil servants in 
Scotland inevitably have little prior experience, and which is notoriously complex.   An 
adequate policy unit will require a substantial number of officials to be allocated to the task 
(ideally at least some officials from the DWP) and it would also be desirable the SG to set up 
structures for receiving external advice, perhaps an equivalent to the UK Social Security 
Advisory Committee.14 Developments of this type are already underway.15 
 
The SG will also have to establish a system of administration. The two principal options were 
to agree with the UK Government that the DWP would administer the devolved benefits on 
the SG’s behalf, or to set up a new Scottish social security agency. The SG has opted for the 
latter which will be directly accountable to Scottish Ministers who are in turn accountable to 
the SP. The SG has also reacted to claims that a   cultural shift in governmental attitudes to 
claimants is required,16 by promising that the new organisation will treat claimants with 
dignity and respect.17  
 
In parallel with new policy and administrative structures, the SP will need to ensure that it 
can adequately perform its constitutional functions of legislation and scrutiny of the 
executive. A social security committee has been established for the 5th session of the Scottish 
Parliament with a remit to consider and report on matters relating to social security falling 
within the responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary for Communities, Social Security and 
Equalities. It will be the subject committee for legislation and other purposes. Significant 
preparatory work has been done by the Scottish Welfare Reform Committee and its 2015 
report, The Future Delivery of Social Security in Scotland18 has helped to make social 
security a significant focus of interest within the SP. 
 
 
F. Intergovernmental Co-ordination 
 
Because of the number and complexity of linkages between different parts of the system, 
devolution of social security will create a real need for inter-governmental co-operation.  
Policy co-ordination will be required to minimise adverse spill-over effects, whether financial 
or behavioural, and to comply with the ‘no-detriment’ principle set out by the Smith 
Commission.19 There will also be a need for intergovernmental co-ordination of 
administration given that many persons will be claiming both reserved and devolved benefits 
at the same time and also the likelihood of some housing aspects of UC being varied. 
                                                          
13 See Fiscal Framework, above note 10. 
14 Before the referendum, the SG set up the Expert Working Group on Welfare which provided analysis and 
recommendations on the SG’s plans for social security benefits in the event of independence. See Re-thinking 
Welfare: Fair, Personal and Simple (2015), available at: http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2014/06/7760  
15 Scottish Government, Creating a Fairer Scotland: A New Future for Social Security in Scotland (2016) 
available at: http://www.gov.scot/Topics/People/fairerscotland/future-powers/Publications/Future  
16 See The Future Delivery of Social Security in Scotland, note 13 above. 
17 Creating a Fairer Scotland, note 15 above.  
18 See note 14 above. 
19 See S. Eden, this volume  
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In recognition of this inter-dependence, the machinery for inter-governmental co-operation 
has been enhanced.  A new Joint Ministerial Working Group on Welfare has been set up, 
which is intended to be the principal mechanism for co-ordination at ministerial level, and the 
DWP has also set up an implementation programme team responsible for working with the 
Scottish Government on the implementation of the new powers.20  Finally, the Fiscal 
Framework sets out a new dispute resolution mechanism covering all disputes arising from 
direct and behaviour spill-over effects and other disputes related to the fiscal framework such 
as calculation of block grant adjustments.  
 
G. Appeals 
 
It has long been a principle of UK social security administration that claimants should have 
the right to appeal an adverse decision to an independent tribunal. Currently, appeals lie to 
the Social Entitlement Chamber of the First-tier tribunal (following a mandatory 
reconsideration of the decision by the DWP).  The separate provision in section 39 of the 
2016 Act devolving all powers over the management and operation of the reserved tribunals 
in Scotland means that the Scottish Courts and Tribunal Service (SCTS) will take over the 
staff and operations of HM Courts and Tribunals Service in Scotland. Thus the SG will in 
future be able to change at least some operational aspects of the tribunal system for social 
security appeals although it is not yet clear how far that will go.21 
 
 
H. Conclusion 
 
Devolution of social security is a significant extension of the functional competence of 
devolved governance in Scotland. But the successful development and implementation of a 
distinct Scottish approach to social security faces many challenges.  Even if the political will 
to make substantial change exists, financial constraints derived from the structure of 
devolution financing, administrative structures and disputes between the two governments all 
have the potential to be significant obstacles. 
 
Tom Mullen 
University of Glasgow 
                                                          
20 HL Hansard, 29th February 2016, cols 682-683. 
21 C. Gill & T. Mullen, “Scottish Tribunals: Smith Commission Proposes Major Transfer of Jurisdiction to 
Scotland”, available at: https://ukaji.org/2015/02/18/analysis-scottish-tribunals-smith-commission-proposes-
major-transfer-of-jurisdiction-to-scotland/  
